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Part 2. The 'Technological Fix': Greening Industry and 
Business 
Chapter 4 
Effects of Economic and Environmental Reform on the 
Diffusion of Cleaner Coal Technology in China 
Stephanie B. Ohshita and Leonard Ortolano 
INTRODUCTION 
Coal is both the major fuel for China's economic development and the 
major source of its severe air pollution. China's reliance on coal for nearly 
three-qua rters of its primary energy has contributed to local air pollution, 
regional acid rain and global climate change. At the same t ime, the coun-
try's coal consumption has electrified its growing cities and helped Chinese 
steel and chemical industries to become internationa l powerhouses. 
This contribution considers how the intertwined issues of environmental 
reform and economic reform have a ffected efforts to reduce coal-related air 
pollution in China. Our analysis focuses on government efforts to promote the 
diffusion of cleaner coal technologies (CCTs) among industria l state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). We utilize a framework of 'fragmented authoritarianism' 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988) fo r our investigation of CCT-related 
policies, examining the changing relationships among central and local 
government actors and enterprises during the past decade of economic 
reforms. We also examine how economic reforms have influenced environ-
mental policy development at the centre, environmental policy implementation 
at the local level, and the response of enterprises to these changing policies. 
Fragmented authoritarianism helps explain why, despite government efforts to 
promote technologies that reduce coal-related ai r pollution in C hina, the 
diffusion of CCT has been slow. 
We a rgue that the poor diffusion of CCT has been due to: ( I) conflicting 
interests in policy development amo ng centra l govern ment agencies; (2) 
tensions between central and local governments in po licy implementat ion; 
and (3) a lack of strong incentives for enterpri ses to adopt CCT. Although 
solutions to C hina's coa l-related pollution problems require integrated 
planning of environmental , energy and economic policies, central government 
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decisio n making on CCT is fragmented . Promoting the diffusion of CCT 
requires active involvement of loca l governments, but policies do not yet 
add ress the shifting balance of power from central to local governments 
which has been spurred by economic reform. In addition , centra l govern-
ment po licies for CCT have no t sufficiently considered the growing auton-
omy o f SOEs no r the fin a ncia l pressures they fa ce from economic reforms. 
Cleaner Coal Technology in China 
T he terms 'clean coal technology' and 'cleaner coal technology' encompass a 
wide range of equipment and methods a imed at reducing pollution from coal 
prepa ratio n a nd utilization.' Given the dominance of coa l in China 's domes-
tic energy mix, CCT represents a pragm atic strategy for pollution reduction. 
Broadly spea king, CCTs can be divided into four ca tego ries according to the 
stage of coa l fl ow at which they a re applied : pre-combustion , conversion, 
combustio n a nd post-combustio n. Table I summa rizes the techno logies in 
each category, a long with their environmenta l and energy o bjectives. 
The p re-combustion techno logies in Table I include coal washing, bri-
q uetting a nd coal- water mixture (CWM) technologies. Coal washing is the 
most widespread fo rm of CCT in China; briquettes for residential use are 
a lso common. Am o ng co nversio n technologies, coal gasification for the 
productio n of town gas has been on the increase in China and helps to 
red uce loca l a ir pollution in cities. With nea rly 500,000 industria l boilers in 
China , improvements in combustion effi ciency could produce significant 
environmenta l benefits. Flue gas desulphurization (FGD) technology, often 
referred to as a 'scrubber', is the ma in type of post-combustion CCT. 
For illustrative purposes, we focus on two types of CCT in this contribution: 
coa l washing, a pre-combustio n technology; and FGD, a post-combustion 
techno logy. Coal washing has relatively low costs and yields multiple environ-
menta l a nd energy conse rvatio n benefits by reducing the sulfur and ash 
content of coa l. However, waste water and sludge from coal washing must 
be ma naged properly to avoid se rio us water and land pollution problems. 
Compared to coa l washing, FGD techno logy has high sulfur remova l effi-
ciency, but it is an end-of-pipe pollution control technology focused solely on 
the removal of sulphur diox ide (S02) . Adva nced FGD units ca n remove as 
much as 99 per cent of S02 but units are costly a nd consume large amounts of 
energy and mate ria ls. Capita l costs of FGD techno logy may be ten times 
higher tha n coa l washing techno logy, and operating costs a re two to three 
times higher (CCP UA a nd EPRI, 2000). 
I . We use the term cleaner coal technology to emphasize tha t coa l-related poll ution is 
reduced , no t eliminated . Other o ptions fo r address ing C hina 's coa l-related 
enviro nmenta l problems include renewable energy and energy efliciency. 
Table I. Coal Flow and Cleaner Coal Technologies 
COAL FLOW 
Pre-Combustion 
Preparation 
Processing 
Conversion 
Conversion 
Combustion 
Combustion 
Post-Combustion 
Pollutant Control 
TYPE OF CCT 
Coal Preparation 
Briq uetting 
Handling 
Liquefaction 
Gasification 
Coking 
High-efficiency 
Combustion 
Exhaust Gas 
Treatment 
Ash Utilization 
EXAMPLES 
Coal washing, process control technology 
Bio-briquetting, conventiona l carboniza tion 
briq uetting 
CWM with sulphur removal 
Bituminous and brown coal liquefaction technology 
Coal gas fo r towns and cities, integrated gasification 
combined cycle power generation (IGCC) 
Improved coking technology, advanced pyrolysis 
technology, organic chemical production 
Circulating fluidized bed boiler (CFB), CFB with 
sulphur remova l, pressurized fluidized bed 
combustion (PF BC) 
Flue gas deskulphurization (FGD), electrosta tic 
precipitation (ESP) 
Use of ash in fertilizer and bricks 
No te: Technologies examined in thi s paper are noted in bold. 
Source: Ohshita (2003 : 36) . 
OBJECTIVES 
Remove debris, ash (20- 50%), sulphur (40- 50%); 
improve coal quality and combustion efficiency; 
conserve wa ter 
Shape coa l for more efficient combustion; incorporate 
sulphur remova l agent 
Improve ease of handling; incorporate sulphur removal 
agent; CWM as o il a lternative in industrial boi lers 
Liquefied coal as an a lternati ve to o il 
Gasified coal as an a lternative to natural gas; reduce 
residential pollution (by using coal gas rather than 
direct coal combustion); improve effi ciency and reduce 
pollution from electric power generation 
Improve effi ciency and reduce emissions of S02, NOx, 
particulates, volatile organics, etc. from metallurgical 
and chemical industries 
Improve efficiency; reduce C0 2 emissions; reduce 
emissions of S02, NOx, particulates, and other 
pollutants 
Reduce emissions of S0 2 (75 - 99%) and pa rticula tes 
Reduce solid waste 
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The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model 
For decades, Chinese scholars have used the 'fragmented authoritarianism' 
model to help explain policy design and implementation within China 
during post-Mao economic reforms (see, for example, Lieberthal , 1992; 
Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Wang, 1995). This model argues that, 
despite views of China as a strong, centrally-dominated developmental 
state, decision-making power in much of the Chinese bureaucracy is di s-
jointed a nd fragmented . The model also hold s that the fragmentation 
is structura lly based and ha s increa sed during th e reform period . 
Consequently, ba rga ining has become increasingly important in efforts to 
attain policy consensus. The following elements contribute to the fragmen-
tation of authority within the Chinese administrative system: 
• Organization of bureaucracies into hierarchical, functional systems 
(xitong) with vertical reporting relationships known as tiao. This structure 
a llows authority in a particular policy arena , such as environmental 
protection, to fl ow vertically from the ministeria l level (such as the State 
Environmental Protection Administration or SEPA) down through coun-
terpart organizations (in thi s case, environmental protection bureaus or 
EPBs) at lower levels. 
• Territoria l or kuai reporting relationships in which a governmental 
organizat ion at the sub-nationa l level reports to the local governmental 
leadershi p at that level (for example, the reporting relationship of a 
municipal EPB to the mayor of the municipality) . 
• The bureaucratic ranking system , under which an agency with a parti-
cular rank is unable to exert a uthority over other governmental organ-
izations having the same or higher rank. 
• Fiscal decentra lization , in which budgeta ry authority has devolved to 
local levels thereby enabling many local burea ucratic units to acquire 
'extra-budgetary funds. ' 
• Decentralized decision-making authority, in which the central govern-
ment has delegated increased responsibilities for decision making to 
local governments and enterprises in a n effort to improve the economy. 
The fragmented a uthoritarianism model has been most successfu lly used to 
explain decision making in economic bureaucracies, particularly at the central 
level government (Naughton, 1992). Bargaining behaviour resulting from the 
fragmented struct ure of public ad ministration is most often observed when 
tangible resources are involved (such as large investment projects) and there is 
leeway in how a policy ca n be implemented (Lieberthal, 1992: 18). Scholars 
examining agencies at loca l levels of government and in non-economic po licy 
arenas have provided further nuance a nd highlighted the model's limitations. 
For example, Walder (1992) emphasizes that barga ining between municipal 
governments and enterpri ses over financial fl ows stems no t so much from 
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fragmentation of authority, but from efforts to reduce risks and provide 
equitable resource distribution during the transition from central planning 
to a socialist market economy. Manion (1992), in a study of personnel policy, 
finds that if a policy is vague or inconsistent with other directives faced by 
local government, it is unlikely to be implemented. This finding is supported 
by research on environmental policy implementation in China (Ma and 
Ortolano, 2000; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). 
The fragmented authoritarianism model , along with some of its extensions 
and critiques, has explanatory power for the case of CCT-related policy 
design and implementation by China's environmental administration . Two 
aspects of the model are particularly useful in analysing the diffusion of CCT: 
the structure of bureaucratic authority; and changes in incentives that have 
accompanied fiscal decentralization and enterprise deregulation. As we will 
show, the outcomes of bargaining processes on a particular issue sometimes 
yield policy inconsistencies with significant consequences for the ability to 
diffuse CCT. We will also show that fiscal decentralization and enterprise 
deregulation have given industrial SOEs incentives to prioritize profit max-
imization, which sometimes comes at the expense of investments in environ-
mental protection . Moreover, because of their ability to extract greater extra-
budgetary funds from enterprises, local governments have financial incentives 
to prioritize economic development over environmental protection. 
Subsequent sections of this contribution examine fragmented authoritar-
ianism in the behaviour of three sets of actors pertinent to the diffusion of 
CCT: central agencies, local governments and industrial state-owned enter-
prises. The fragmentation of authority for energy and environmental policy 
among national ministries is discussed in detail in the next section. The 
analysis then considers central- local government tensions in policy imple-
mentation, which relate directly to the decentralization of authority for 
decision making in the fragmented authoritarianism model. The remaining 
sections examine changing incentives for SOEs to adopt two types of CCT: 
coal washing and flue gas desulphurization. 
FRAGMENTED DECISION-MAKING AT THE CENTRE 
Chinese central government decision making related to CCT is fragmented 
and dispersed among severa l ministries and commissions. In the absence of 
a single energy agency, the State Development and Plann ing Commission 
(SDPC) led broad policies on energy pricing and the structure of energy 
supply in the 1990s.2 The Commission's policy is informed by the work of 
2. In 2003, SDPC was tra nsformed int o the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). SETC was disbanded a nd its function s di stributed among NDRC and other 
ministri es. Supervision of industrial bureaus also shifted. We use SDPC and SETC in thi s 
contribution to refl ect the names of the organiza tions during our period of analysis. 
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the Energy Research Institute (ERI), which is under SDPC control. 
Decisions on industrial structure and technology policy for energy-intensive 
enterprises were led by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 
and by industry-specific state bureaus (sometimes referred to as adminis-
trations) under SETC supervision, such as the State Bureau of the Coal 
Industry and the State Bureau of the Chemical Industry. Technology policy 
was also under the purview of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), which promotes the acquisition, development, and dissemination 
of technology in China. Policies affecting the price of coal or commodities 
produced by coal-consuming enterprises must gain the approval of the State 
Price Bureau and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Environmental policy 
that could drive the adoption of CCT is the responsibility of the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). 
Jurisdiction over CCT-related policies shifted during the 1990s, with the 
most significant changes occurring in 1998. The 1998 reforms sought to 
address some long-standing problems of China's central government admin-
istration: the overlap of responsibilities and competition among agencies, 
conflicts of interest caused by the mixing of government and business 
functions, and inefficiency due to overstaffing and excessively large govern-
ment offices (CESTT, 1998). The number of ministries and commissions 
was reduced from forty to twenty-nine, and the number of staff was cut by 
half withjn the following three-year period. The 1998 restructuring gave 
prominence to environmental protection by elevating the former National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to just half a rank below minis-
terial level. The former Environmental Protection Committee of the State 
Council , which had often advocated different priorities than SEPA, was 
disbanded (ERM China, 1998). While these were hopeful signs for 
strengthening of environmental administration, economic commissions, plan-
ning commissions, and industrial bureaus continued to have stronger connec-
tions to enterprises and greater influence over enterprise technology adoption. 
Administrative restructuring has reduced , but not eliminated, fragmenta-
tion of central government policy making on energy and environment. This 
outcome is particularly evident in the efforts of SEPA to implement a 
programme of so2 fees that would give coal-consuming industries strong 
incentives to reduce air pollution , through the adoption of production 
process changes and end-of-pipe controls. 
Tensions in Policy Development: The S02 Fee Programme 
Since the beginning of the post-Mao period, China's environmental admin-
istration has advocated the collection of emission fees from enterprises 
discharging S02 and other pollutants in excess of national standards. If 
emission fees are set high enough, they can motivate pollution reduction in 
two ways. First , high fees can encourage enterprises to cut their emissions 
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Table 2. Key Chinese Policies Promoting FGD and S02 Fees 
Year Policy 
1982 Provisional Regulatio n on 
Collecting Fees fo r Pollutant 
Discharge 
1987 Air Pollution Control Law 
(original) 
1988 Provisional Regulation on 
Loans from Pollutant Fees 
1992 Circular on Trial Collect ion 
of S02 Fees 
1995 Air Po llut ion Control Law 
(revised) 
1996 Total Emissions Control Policy 
1997 China Trans-Century Green 
Project (Phase I , 1996- 2000)* 
1998 Two Control Zo nes Policy 
a nd Regulation on Thermal 
Power Plant Emissions 
2000 Air Po llution Control Law 
(revised) 
2002 Tenth Five Year Pla n for 
Environmental Protection 
Provisions Related to FGD and SO, Fees 
Set S01 fees at 0.04 yuan per kg SO, emitted in excess 
of standards. 
Established SO, concentration standards; no specific 
FGD requirements. 
Allowed EPBs to loan pollutant fee money to 
en terprises for pollution control investments. 
Launched trial coll ec tion of higher SO, fees (0 .2 yuan 
per kg SO,) in Guangdong and Guizhou provinces 
a nd in nine cities including Qingdao and Hangzhou. 
Revised requirements, with a focus on S02 control 
at power pla nts and large industrial enterprises; 
ca lled for FGD if low-sulphur coal was not used , 
but did not contain strict requirements for FG D. 
Authorized NEPA to determine emission a llocat ions 
for the provinces and to direct local governments to 
use permits to establish emission limits for en terprises 
under their jurisdiction. Stricter limits increased the 
need for FGD. 
Planned twenty-seven FGD projects at power plants in 
acid rain regions and cities wi th severe SO, pollution . 
Formally established acid rain and air pollution 
control zones. Ca lled for FGD at new power plants 
burning coal with S> 1% and raised fees to 0.2 yuan 
per kg S02 for all no n-compliant enterpri ses in the 
two control zones. 
Strengthened requirements for FG D at power plants. 
Reinforced requirements for S02 control, 
including FGD. 
No te: *In the Ninth Five Year Plan for Environmental Protection and Long-Term Targets for 
the Year 2010. 
and meet national standards because doing so eliminates the need to pay 
fees. Second, revenues generated from emission fees can be used to subsidize 
enterprise adoption of pollution control equipment through grants or low-
interest loans. The evolution of the S02 fees policy and the promotion. of 
FG D is shown in Table 2. 
After some early trials, fees on S02 and other pollutants in Ch ina were 
the subject of a 1982 regulation (State Council, 1982). The fee programme 
was expanded in 1988, when EPBs began to make loans of pollution fee 
money to support enterprises in installing pollution control eq uipment 
(State Council , 1988). Notwithstanding these regulations, the effects of the 
so2 fee programme were modest beca use the fees - 0.04 yuan (0.5 us 
cents)3 per kg of so2 - were much lower than the cost of installing and 
3. Conversion based on a typical 1998 exchange rate of 8.32 yuan/US$ I. 
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operating control equipment. Enterprises found it cheaper to pay the fees 
and keep polluting rather than control pollution . 
During the 1990s, NEPA urged that S02 fees be increased, but the State 
Council and other central government agencies resisted because of concerns 
about economic development. Although the State Council's Environmental 
Protection Commission supported the increase, it was opposed by both the 
State Price Burea u and the Ministry of Finance.4 NEPA made a small advance 
in 1992 when a fee of 0.2 yuan (2.4 us cents) per kg so2 was approved on a 
trial basis in two provinces and nine cities with severe air pollution (NEPA 
et al. , 1992; State Price Bureau and Ministry of Finance; 2002). 
NEPA's efforts to promote higher S02 fees and otherwise strengthen a ir 
pollution control requirements were given a significant boost in 1997 and 
1998 when Premier Zhu Rongji and the State Council were briefed on the 
negative effects of air pollution on the economy. As one example of the 
economic costs of outdoor air pollution, Chinese researchers estimated that 
emissions of S02 and particulate matter caused an annual loss of 95 billion 
yuan (US$ 11.4 billion) in terms of human health damages, a loss of 1.6 per 
cent of GOP (Gao and Li , 1999: 145). A widely cited World Bank study 
(1997) gave similar estimates. As a result of these and other economic 
studies, China's top leadership became increasingly interested in attempting 
to curb air pollution beca use of its adverse economic effects.5 
Action came in January 1998, when the State Council approved NEPA's 
plan on the 'Two Control Zones' for acid rain and air pollution control 
(State Council, 1998; SEPA, SDPC, et al. , 1998). The State Council's 
approval authorized the collection of so2 fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2 
beyond the 1992 trial areas. These fees were to be collected from enterprises 
exceeding emission limits within the acid rain and air pollution control 
zones (Minchener et al. , 1999: 561 ; State Council , 1998). The higher fees 
have still not been widely implemented , however, even though they are 
below the cost of installing and operating pollution control equipment, 
because local officials a re concerned about possible adverse effects on the 
economy. 6 Local government resi stance to collection of S02 fees led SEPA 
to issue another notice in 2000, emphasizing that the State Council had 
approved the higher fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2 and that local governments 
must collect them (SEPA, 2000). 
4. The fact that the Environmenta l Protection Commission supported SEPA's position is 
noteworthy because the Commission (d isbanded in 1998) and SEPA (then NEPA) had 
frequently disagreed on environmental priorit ies and projects. See Vermeer (1998: 977). 
5. Based on interviews by S. B. Ohshita with two researchers advising the State Council's 
Na tional Resource and Environmental Protection Commit tee (headed by Qu Geping) , 
Beij ing, November 1998 and 1999. 
6. Based on interviews by S. B. Ohshita with a senior SEPA official and three envi ronmenta l 
researchers advising SEPA, Beijing, November 1998 and 1999; and with the manager of a 
chemical plant operating FG D equipment , Shandong, October 1998. 
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The struggle to implement the S02 fee programme illustrates how policy 
negot iations among central government agencies with different priorities 
resulted in weak policy signa ls and poor CCT diffusion. Without the higher 
S02 fees advocated by SEPA, industrial enterprises had little incentive to 
invest in CCT. Even after fees were raised , CCT diffusion was slowed 
beca use of loca l government resistance to implementing centrally-issued 
pollution control policies that were inconsistent with local development 
goals. 
CENTRAL-LOCAL TENSIONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Local implementation of centra l government policy - especially environ-
mental policy - is crucial for the promotion of CCT. Local governments 
are obliged to carry out central government environmental directives, but 
they a lso have strong incentives to promote loca l economic development 
(Oi, 1999). This central- loca l tension is rooted in the organizational struc-
ture of China 's environmental bureaucracy. Figure I illustrates the relation-
ships among central and local government agencies relevant to CCT policy. 
Local EPBs report vertically to SEPA (t iao relationship), but must also 
report horizontally to local industrial bureaus and planning commissions 
(kuai relationship). The necessity of working with pro-development agencies 
of local government can make it difficult for EPBs to achieve environmental 
goa ls. Often local agencies promoting economic development have larger 
budgets, more staff and greater political strength than local EPBs. Mayors 
o r other high-ranking loca l officials can a lso strongly influence EPB 
activi ty. As a result, local agencies and leaders may win out over the EPB if 
centra l environmenta l directives appear to conflict with local economic 
objectives. 7 
Economic reforms of the 1990s intensified central- local government ten-
sions linked to CCT. Policies promoting CCT call for investment in new 
technology by enterprises, especially SOEs. However, SOEs must have 
approval of their supervising government agency to invest in CCT. As 
more and more SOEs shifted from central government control to super-
vi sion by loca l governments, their financia l performance became increa s-
ingly important to local governments. China 's major tax reform in 1994, 
which redistributed tax revenues between the central and local government , 
made local officials especially keen on enhancing their budgets.8 Because 
they were allowed to keep a major portion of taxes from the enterprises they 
controlled, local governments had incentives to increase enterprise profits. 
7. Fo r further discussion, see Jahiel (1998); Ma (1997); Ma and Ortolano (2000); Sinkule and 
Ortola no ( 1995). 
8. For details on the 1994 tax reform, see Cao et al. (1999). For local government response to 
tax reforms, see Oi ( 1999). 
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Figure 1. Central- Local Chinese Government Relations Pertinent to CCT 
Policy in the 1990s 
National Peoples Congress, 
State Counci l 
Provincial Planning 
Commissions (DRCs) 
Source: Authors, based on Ma and Ortolano (2000); Sinkule and Ortolano (1995). Names in 
pa rentheses reflect post-2000 changes in administrative structure. 
The 1995 budget law gave local governments a further incentive to 
improve the fi nancia l performance of enterprises under their supervision. 
This law prohibited the central government from deficit financing its current 
account and it required a ll levels of local government to have balanced 
budgets (Cao et al. , 1999). The 1994 tax reform coupled with the 1995 
budget law made loca l officials scrutinize enterprise investments more care-
fu lly, especially investments in technology like CCT that might not generate 
a return during the local officials' terms of office.9 
In general , the 1990s economic reforms aimed at industrial SOEs signifi-
cantly reduced the abi lity of unprofitable enterpri ses to rely on government 
bailouts, and the reforms forced enterprises (a nd the local governments over-
seeing them) to face ha rd budget constraints (Cao et al. , 1999; Lardy, 1998). 
Because the reforms also made it more difficult for SOEs to access credit, they 
discouraged many SOEs fro m engaging in pollution control activities that 
might red uce net revenues or require large loans.10 The implication for CCT 
9. Beca use top- level local offi c ia ls are typica lly assigned to a particular location for only a 
few yea rs before being transferred , they tend to prefer investments with paybacks during 
their terms of offi ce. See a lso BECon and PN L ( 1996). 
I 0. Tightened monetary policy in 1993 decreased the rate of new loans to SOEs and subse-
quent ba nking reforms also made loan cri teri a more stringent. 
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adoption was that industrial enterprises only had incentives to adopt techno-
logies that would enhance profits or improve their competitive advantage, such 
as coal washing technology. Technologies with extremely high capital costs -
such as FGD - were not appealing, as they required hard-to-get loans. 
The fragmentation of central government decision making pertaining to 
environment and development thus makes it difficult for the central govern-
ment to send consistent policy signals encouraging enterprises to adopt 
CCT. Moreover, the impacts of reforms related to local budgets and super-
vision of state-owned enterprises have made both SOEs and the local 
governments that supervise them reluctant to invest in CCTs unless those 
technologies yield short-term profits. 
CONFLICTING PRIORITIES, WEAK INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF FGD 
This section examines how fragmented a uthoritarianism affected the diffu-
sion of FGD, as dispersed decision making and agencies with rival objec-
tives restricted the promotion of FGD. This case also shows that expensive, 
end-of-pipe pollution control technology is generally at odds with the 
economic interests of enterprises and local governments. 
During most of the 1990s, China 's central government did not have a 
consistent policy position on FGD. By 1998, when SDPC and the State 
Coal Bureau finally backed SEPA's push for FGD, economic reforms had 
diminished the ability of the central agencies to control local decision 
making, and local governments were not inclined to encourage investments 
tha t decreased enterprise profits. Consequently, FGD technology 
experienced limited adoption by Chinese power plants and almost no adop-
tion by industrial enterprises. 
With S02 emission levels rising and air quality worsening, NEPA (and 
later SEPA) determined that its goals for emission reduction and ambient 
air quality could not be met without strong controls such as FGD. NEPA's 
FGD requirements focused on power plants beca use they are the largest 
individual so urces of S02• 11 Moreover, the contribution of electric power 
plants to total emissions of S02 in China has been growing. Between I 990 
and 2000, so2 emissions from thermal power plants grew from 25 to nearly 
50 per cent of the national total. 12 
Policies promoting FGD began with the I 995 revisions to the Air 
Pollution Control Law and subsequent S02 concentration standards (see 
Table 2 above). The push for FGD became stronger with NEPA's I 996 
'Total Emiss ions Co ntrol Policy', which called for provinces and lower 
II . SEPA's emphasis on FGD fo r power plants is simi lar to the approach for S02 control in 
other count ries. 
12. Emissions stati stics from SEPA (1998b). For details on this estimate, see Ohshita (2003: 
Ch 9). 
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levels of government to control the total amount of so2 and other pollu-
ta nts by issuing emission limits on individual sources. Control of total 
emiss ions heightened the need for FGD at large emission so urces like 
power plants, but beca use of weak implementation of the total emissions 
control requirements, only a few FGD units were adopted. 
The China Tra ns-Century Green Project (Phase I, 1996- 2000), part of the 
Ninth Five Year Plan for Environmental Protection and Long-term Targets 
for the Year 20 I 0, identified twenty-seven FG D projects to be undertaken 
in areas affected by acid ra in a nd urban areas with severe air pollution 
(NEPA et a l. , 1997). Although the Trans-Century Green Project also called 
for FGD at large industria l enterprises, no specific projects were listed. With 
the approval of NEPA's 'Two Control Zones' policy by the State Council 
and the issua nce of new thermal power plant so2 sta nda rds in 1998, the 
regu latory push fo r FGD at power plants was strengthened. The 1998 
regulations required FGD at new power plants burning coal with sulphur 
content above 1 per cent. However, the regulations did not explicitly require 
FGD at existing power pla nts or large industrial enterprises. Local govern-
ments were given discretion to decide whether ex isting enterprises should 
install FGD. 
NEPA's promotion of FGD was resisted by both industry and govern-
ment , beginning with other centra l government agencies during the policy-
making process. The Ministry of Finance, SDPC, SETC and the former 
Ministry of Electric Power wielded greater bureaucratic power than NEPA; 
when differences emerged , the o ther ministries usually got their way in 
policy decisions. In the case of high-cost FGD, there was tension between 
NEPA's pollution control goals and SDPC's economic development objec-
tives. NEPA's desire to cut power plant S02 emissions with FGD also 
conflicted with effo rts of SETC and the former Ministry of Electric Power 
to rapidly expand electric power production during the 1990s (Vermeer, 
1998). Unlike some other cleaner coal technologies, FGD lowers profits by 
rai sing capital and operating costs. Flue gas desulphurization was also at 
odds with SDPC and SETC energy efficiency goals, as FGD operation 
consumes large quantities of energy. 
The limited support for FGD that eventually emerged during the 1990s 
can be attributed to the small area of overlap between NEPA's goals and 
those of other central government agencies. Estimates of the costs of pollu-
tion damage indicated that SDPC o bjectives for macro-economic develop-
ment would be served by some level of S02 control, including FGD. Flue 
gas desulphurization would a lso enable new power plants to fire readily 
available domestic coa l rather than expensive and less-abundan t natura l 
gas; the coal option was favo ured by SDPC, SETC an d the former 
Mini st ry of Electric Power. 13 But SDPC estimates of FGD cost led it to 
plan for FGD at only one-qua rter of new power plants in the Ninth F ive 
Year Pla n, not for a ll new plants as N EPA had suggested (US Embassy 
Beiji ng, 2000). 
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From the perspective of Chinese state-owned enterprises, FGD is unap-
pealing in terms of economics, operations and management. FGD can 
increase capital costs of a new power plant by 15 to 20 per cent, and it 
has high operating costs (Ohshita and Lu, 1996: 41 ). For industrial enter-
prises outside of the power sector, cost increases can be even more dramatic. 
Because it is an end-of-pipe pollution control device, FGD offers no process 
benefits. Operation is complex, maintenance is demanding and re-use or 
disposal of waste sludge is problematic. Furthermore, FGD technology is 
not available domestically and must be imported, which requires identifying 
foreign vendors, obtaining foreign credit, completing tedious customs pro-
cedures, and working around language barriers during training. Economic 
reform pressures on SOEs to improve financial performance have only 
intensified enterprise resistance to FGD. In short, enterprises are not likely 
to adopt FGD if they can avoid it (Ohshita and Ortolano, 1999, 2002). 
Even when forced to adopt FGD by regulation, Chinese SOEs have had 
difficulty obtaining the necessary funds to purchase and operate the equip-
ment. During the 1990s, little financing was available domestically. 
Government investment in FGD was small and banks were generally 
unwilling to provide loans for pollution control equipment as expensive as 
FGD. The S02 fee programme did not generate NEPA's desired level of funds 
for investment in air pollution control equipment, because the fee level 
was low and (as described above) fees were not collected regularly by EPBs. 
The limited diffusion of FGD that did occur in China during the 1990s 
was accomplished primarily with concessional financing. The World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese government have been the 
main sources of capital funds for FGD at Chinese power plants (Evans, 
1999). Japan's Green Aid Plan appears to be the only source of foreign 
financing for FGD at Chinese enterprises outside the power sector (Ohshita, 
2003; Watson, 2002). With FGD requirements in the 2000 revisions to the 
Air Pollution Control Law, and another surge in power plant construction 
in 2004, conditions for wider diffusion of FGD equipment in China are 
beginning to emerge. Today, most equipment is made domestically and costs 
have dropped to 400 yuan/kg. 
CHALLENGES IN CO-ORDINATlNG ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC 
REFORM: THE CASE OF COAL WASHING 
Despite government efforts to promote coal washing, the production of 
washed coal in China experienced ups and downs during the 1990s. This 
was the result, in part, of dispersed bureaucratic decision-making structures 
13 . Chinese energy policy began to promote use of natural gas in the late 1990s, but coal -fired 
power plants are still seen as a short-term necessit y. 
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and difficulties in co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms. Our 
examination of coal washing technology highlights the difficulties of creat-
ing timely incentives for technology adopters during periods of dynamic 
reform, such as coal pricing liberalization and coal industry restructuring. 
The incentives for Chinese coal mines to adopt and utilize coal washing 
technology were strongly influenced by these economic reforms. 
Coal Industry Restructuring and Coal Pricing Reforms 
China 's coal mining industry has been characterized by four main owner-
ship types: large state-owned mines (managed by the central government 
until 1998); small- and medium-sized state-owned mines managed by local 
governments; small , rural collective mines (mines that are township and 
village enterprises, or TVEs); and private mines (lEA, 1999b; Thomson, 
1996). The latter two types are often referred to as non-state mines. Figure 2 
presents trends in coal production by these four types of mine ownership. In 
the early 1980s, more than half of China's coal was produced by the large, 
centrally-managed state-owned mines. Poor performance of the coal indus-
try in the 1980s, accompanied by coal and electricity shortages, prompted 
the central government to relax ownership restrictions and encourage TVEs 
and other types of owners to expand production (lEA, 1999b). As a result, 
Figure 2. Chinese Coal Production by Ownership Type 
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growth in Chinese coal production from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s 
came primarily from non-state mines. 
Energy, particularly coal, was one of the last factors of production to be 
released from strict central planning by the Chinese government. Until the 
early 1990s, coal prices were controlled by the government and kept low in 
order to spur economic growth and prevent hardships for residents using 
coal for heating and cooking. While this policy benefited coal consumers, it 
caused the coal mining industry to become the largest loss-generating 
industrial sector of the Chinese economy (Rawski, 1994). 
As a first step in coal pricing reform, in 1993 the central government 
established a dual pricing system, whereby state-owned mines sold at a low, 
government-controlled price, and township and vi llage mines sold at a 
market-determined price (lEA, 1999a: 104). As market prices rose to nearly 
twice the artificia lly low state price, state-owned mines continued to experi-
ence heavy losses; nearly 90 per cent of state-owned mines reported losses in 
1993 (lEA, 1999b). The dual-pricing system also generated a great deal of 
corruption as low-priced state coal was illegally sold at higher market rates 
(Thomson, 1996). 
In 1994, state-owned mines were allowed to sell a portion of their coal on 
the market. Despite this change, 72 per cent of state-owned coal mines still 
lost money in 1996, prompting the centra l government to liberalize all coal 
prices. With coal in high demand domestically and international oil prices 
boosting coal prices, many large state-owned mines began to move into the 
black in 1997 (l EA, 1999b). 
The 1997 rise in coal prices was short-lived, however. The Asian financial 
crisis, coupled with Chinese domestic economic changes, led to an unex-
pected downturn in coal demand . After decades of demand exceeding 
supply, China experienced a coal glut. The small collective mines were 
most immediately affected , and their prod uction fell the same year. The 
decline in demand was accompanied by a drop in coal prices in early 1998. 
As losses began to mount, the government announced an overhaul of the 
coal industry. The ninety-four large state-owned coal mines were transferred 
from central to local management, mostly to the provincial level. The 2,500 
smaller mines owned by local governments were directed to improve effi-
ciency. Of the 75 ,000 small mines run as TYEs, 25 ,800 were slated for 
closure in an effort to balance supply and demand, improve the overall 
efficiency of the industry, and reverse the drop in coal prices (lEA, 1999b ). 14 
At the end of 2001 , coal prices finally began to rise and the state-owned 
mining sector as a whole began to generate profits again (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2002). Increased demand for Chinese coa l exports and an upturn in 
14. The central government 's effort s to close small mines, for both economic and 
environ mental reasons, have met with loca l resistance, as the mining industry is one of 
the la rgest employers in China. Closed mines continue to be re-opened illega lly. a problem 
SEPA ( 1998a) refers to as "glowing embers re-kindling'. 
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domestic demand helped the industry. Continuing efforts to restrict small 
non-state mines reduced excessive supply and generated some improvements 
in coal quality and mining safety. However, a 2004 surge in domestic and 
international demand has again raised safety and quality challenges for 
China's coal industry (AsiaPulse News, 2004). 
Policies Promoting Coal Washing 
Table 3 summarizes key C hinese policies promoting coal wash ing technol-
ogy during the 1990s. In 1994, the former Ministry of the Coal Industry 
announced its goa ls for expanding the use of CCT, including coal washing 
technology (Zhu and Yu, 1999). Promotion of coal washing in 1994 coin-
cided with the second year of the dua l pricing sys tem for coal and the 
Ministry's efforts to improve coal qua lity and the profitabi lity of large 
state-owned mines. In 1995, rev isions to the Air Po ll ution Control Law 
also encouraged adoption of coal washing technology and the use of washed 
coa l by industrial enterprises (Hao, 1996). In 1996, NEPA, with approval by 
the State Council , began a drive to decrease production of low quality coal 
Table 3. Key Chinese Policies Promoting Coal Washing 
Year Policy 
1994 CCT Pla n 
1995 Air Po llution Control Law (revised) 
1996 ' 15 Smalls' Policy 
1997 Ninth Five Year Plan for Chinese 
Clean Coal Technologies and 
Development Programme to the 
Year 20 10 
1997 Ninth Five Yea r Plan for 
Enviro nmental Protection and Lo ng-
term Targets fo r the Year 20 I 0 
1997 China Trans-Century Green Project 
(Phase I, 1996-2000) 
1998 Two Control Zones Policy for Acid 
Rain a nd Sulphur Dioxide Control 
(i ncluding so2 fees) 
2000 Air Pollution Cont rol Law (revised) 
2002 Tenth Five Yea r Pla n for 
Environmenta l Protection 
Provisions Related to Coal Washing 
Ministry of Coal Industry announced its CCT 
Plan, including coa l washing. 
Encouraged coal washing and use of washed 
coa l by industrial enterpri ses. 
Called for the closure of small mines, many 
wi th high-sulphur coal ; red uced competition 
can help improve adoption of coal washing 
technology by medium and la rge mines. 
Coal washing identified as one of fourteen 
technologies; viewed as fundamental CCT 
for China. 
Called for coal washing as one of severa l 
measures to control S02 and particulate matter 
air pollution. 
Conta ined a few coa l washing projects, 
representing a sma ll subset of the national 
CCT pla n. 
Ba nned the opening of new mines with coal 
having > 3% sulphur; restricted existing mines 
with >3% S; ca lled for new or expa nding mines 
with > 1.5% S to insta ll coal washing 
technology; ca lled for ex isting mines with 
> 1.5% S to adopt coal washing in stages. 
Reinfo rced requirements for S02 cont ro l, 
including coal sulphur restric tions. 
Further promoted coa l washing, as we ll as fuel 
swi tching. 
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by closing small non-state mines (State Council , 1996). Targets for growth 
in coal washing appeared in 1997, as part of the Ninth Five Year Plan (Du 
and Liu, 1999). From a coal washing rate of roughly 25 per cent in 1995, the 
central government planned to increase the rate to 30 per cent by 2000 and 
to reach 40- 50 per cent by 2010 (JCOAL, 1998). 
The strongest policy push for coal washing carne in 1998, when the State 
Council approved SEPA's Two Control Zones policy (State Council , 1998; 
SEPA, 1998b). The policy required new and existing mines in the acid rain 
control zone and the air pollution control zones to adopt coal washing 
technology based on the sulphur content of mined coal. Local governments 
were forbidden to issue permits to proposed new mines whose coal sulphur 
content would be above 3 per cent. Existing mines with a coal sulphur 
content greater than 3 per cent were to be closed or have their production 
restricted. As deta iled in Table 3, requirements for mines with lower coal 
sulphur content were less strict. 
Policies promoting coal washing reflect increased co-ordination by central 
government agencies in response to their overlapping economic, energy and 
environmental interests and objectives in the late 1990s. When coal pricing 
liberalization and coal industry restructuring encountered an unexpected 
downturn in coal demand, the economic and industry ministries gave prior-
ity to the promotion of coal washing and closure of small non-state mines, 
which was consistent with SEPA's efforts to curb coal-related ai r pollution. 
As shown below, coal washing increased as the different priorities of centra l 
government agencies became more closely aligned and burea ucratic co-
ordination improved. The trend in coal washing during the 1990s points to the 
benefits of co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms, so as to create 
consistent policy signals and incentives to which enterprises can respond. 
Incentives and Barriers to Coal Washing 
China met some of its goals for coal washing during the 1990s: in percentage 
terms, it achieved its target of 30 per cent by 2000. But the production of 
washed coal in abso lute terms (Mt/year) did not reach levels hoped for by 
Chinese officials. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the production of washed 
coal, based on data from China's large state-owned mines (LBNL, 2004). 
Coking coal is the dominant form of washed coal , and is used by the iron 
and steel secto r. A smaller share of washed steam coal is used mostly by 
electric power plants (CCPUA and EPRI , 2000: 3- 10). Between 1980 and 
1990, the production of washed coal at large state-owned mines rose slowly, 
encouraged mainly by government subsidies and directed by central plan-
ning. After a slight dip in 1991 and 1992, production rose in 1993, coincid-
ing with the liberalization of coal prices. In 1997, washed coal production by 
the la rge mines reached an all-time high. In 1998 and 1999, production of 
washed coal fell sharply, following declines in export and domestic demand, 
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Figure 3. Producrion of Washed Coal By Large State-Owned Mines 
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as well as the drop in coal prices. By 2000, the production of washed coal 
was on the rise again , and by 2002 production had surpassed the 1997 peak. 
The price that mines are able to charge for washed coal is a key determi-
nant in their decision to adopt a nd operate coal washing technology. While 
coal prices va ry substantially in China depending on the destination of the 
coal , with transportation costs accounting for as much as 70 per cent of the 
delivered price (World Bank, 1997), we can make a few generalizations. 
When coal prices were depressed , as they were before the 1996 price liberal-
ization and during the 1997- 99 glut, the price differential between washed 
a nd unwashed coal was substantia l. For example, when the run-of-mine 
price for unwashed coal (that is, the price of coal at the mine, before 
transport and delivery) was around I 00 yuan (US$ 12)15 per ton, the price 
of washed coal was an additional 50 yuan (US$ 6) per ton (CCPUA and 
EPRI , 2000). Thus the run-of-mine price for washed coal was 50 per cent 
higher than the price for unwashed coal. In terms of the price of delivered 
coal, which is the price most directly experienced by the coal consumer, the 
difference is smaller but still notable: prices for delivered washed coal were 
I 0 to 20 per cent higher tha n those for unwashed coal. 
15. Conversion based on a typica l 1998 excha nge rate of 8.32 yuan/US$ I. 
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Demand for washed coal - another determinant in a mine's decision to 
adopt and operate coal washing technology - has been strong in the steel and 
electric power sectors, but generally weak in other industrial sectors. Many 
industrial enterprises were unable to use washed coal because they had out-
moded boiler technology (CCPUA and EPRI, 2000; Fang et al. , 1999). In 
addition , enterprises that were not pressed to meet so2 standards may not 
have felt the need to pay I 0 to 20 per cent more for washed coal. As a result, 
demand for washed coal was generally low outside the steel and electric utility 
sectors, and many mines were not able to charge enough to cover the additional 
production costs for washed coal, especially washed steam coal (JCOAL, 1998). 
Mines that did have incentives to operate coal washing facilities during 
the 1990s were primarily large state-owned mines producing relatively high 
quality coal for export or for sale to domestic steel plants and electric 
utilities. In contrast to these large mines, the many small and medium-size 
coal mines in China had weaker incentives: small Chinese mines operate at a 
low technological level and cannot take advantage of economies of scale. 16 
In general, small mines produce low quality coal and sell it locally; they do 
not compete in higher-priced export markets. Because of their size, small 
mines tend to sell to small enterprises that are Jess likely to purchase washed 
coal. With limited technical resources, modest finances and limited demand 
for washed coal, small mines generally did not adopt coal washing techno-
logy during the 1990s. Recognizing the weak incentives and capabilities at 
small mines, some researchers have suggested that local governments should 
support the construction of centralized coal washing facilities that use 
simple technology (Ohshita , 2003). 
The promotion of coal washing was thus affected by fragmented decision 
making in the Chinese bureaucracy. While there was a trend toward greater 
co-ordination among centra l government agencies, and although the inter-
ests of economic, industrial and environmental ministries were increasingly 
overlapping at the end of the 1990s, decentralization made it more difficult 
for the centre to push its agenda at the local level. Data on coal washing 
how that production of washed coal became more closely linked with the 
market as the reforms progressed . As coal pricing reform and coal industry 
restructuring changed incentives for state-owned mines, the decisions of 
mines and local government to produce washed coal became more heavily 
influenced by economic signals. Coal washing is likely to increase as indus-
tria l modernization enables more enterprises to improve their combustion 
technology and realize the benefits of washed coal. However, as long as 
small mines and small industrial coal consumers continue to exist in large 
numbers, technologies and implementation efforts targeted at small-scale 
enterprises will be needed to realize widespread air quality benefits. 
16. This was emphasized in a uthor interviews with officials at the China Coal Resea rch 
Institute, Beijing, November 1998 and 1999. See a lso Smil (1989, 1998). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
China 's experience with CCT demonstrates some degree of greening of the 
Chinese state, whilst highlighting that significant effort is sti lled needed to 
reconcile environmental protection with economic development. Policies on 
the closure of small coalmines and limits on coal sulphur content are 
positive examples of co-ordination of central government plans for energy, 
environment and economic development - consistent with a 'win- win' 
ecologica l modernization paradigm. In contrast, fragmented authority of 
central government agencies during policy formulation on so2 fees con-
tributed to the poor diffusion of FGD. Improved co-ordination among 
central government agencies can provide clear and consistent signals to 
both local officials and enterprises. Linking economic policies with environ-
mental goals can promote adoption of cleaner technology by emphasizing 
economically-favourable approaches (for example, improved fuel quality 
and energy efficiency) that simultaneously reduce energy-related pollution 
and promote economic development. 
The CCT experience also shows that central agencies have encountered 
difficulties with policy implementation and enforcement by local govern-
ments. As a consequence of economic reforms during the 1990s, especially 
the imposit ion of hard budget constraints and increased market liberal-
ization, local governments prioritized improving the economic performance 
of the enterprises in their jurisdiction. Enforcement of environmental poli-
cies generally received lower priority. This difficulty with enforcement has 
two implications. First, loca l government leaders need incentives that 
reward them for implementing national environmental policies. Such incen-
tives could be provided, for example, by changing the tax treatment of 
investments in cleaner technology, or by increasing the emphasis on envir-
onmental achievements within China 's formal sys tem for evaluating the 
performance of government officials. Second, central government interven-
tion is sti ll needed to counter ma rket signals that lead to actions with 
negative environmenta l impacts. 
Finally, the greening process is only beginning to extend to Chinese 
industry. To improve the diffusion of CCT, regulatory incentives for enter-
prises need to be augmented. During the 1990s, low emission fees and weak 
implementation of some ai r pollution control requirements provided little 
motivation for enterprises to invest in CCT. This could change by increasing 
so2 fees to levels that are comparable to the costs of installing and operat-
ing equipment with lower em iss ions. In addition , domestic financing 
packages (such as tax breaks and low-interest loans) could spur investments 
in pollution control by enterprises, and encourage further development of 
enterprises that manufacture low-cost CCT eq uipment within China. Wider 
di ssemination of information on the economic benefits of cleaner coal 
technologies could a lso promote technology diffusion and ecological mod-
ernization among Chinese enterprises. 
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